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Abstract
We develop a class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities
and we introduce default risk in the model. We ﬁnd that if productivity changes are observed,
policy authorities should be aware of default risk, although being aware of such risk is not
very important following government expenditure changes. Welfare gains from awareness of
default risk are nonnegligible if productivity changes, although welfare gains from awareness
of default risk are tiny following government expenditure changes.
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1 Introduction
The governing Council decided to lower the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis
points, following the 25 basis point decrease on 3 November 2011. Inﬂation is likely to
stay above 2% for several months to come, but it will decline to below 2% during 2012.
The intensiﬁed ﬁnancial market tensions are continuing to dampen economic activity
in the Euro area and the outlook remains subject to high uncertainty and substantial
downside risk.
The above is an extract of a speech by Vi´tor Constanˆcio, vice-president of the ECB on Dec. 8,
2011.1 At the time, a sovereign debt crisis hit the eurozone: the Greek 10-year credit default
swap premium reached USD 20,404 and HCPI inﬂation was 2.8% in April 2012. This speech is
descriptive of the diﬃculty of conducting monetary policy amid a sovereign debt crisis. That is,
the ECB might give up stabilizing inﬂation to prevent the spread of the crisis by lowering the
policy rates to provide liquidity and promote debt deﬂation at that time.
In this paper, we try to dissolve diﬃculties that the ECB faced during the crisis period and
we provide important prescriptions for conducting monetary and ﬁscal policy in an economy with
default risk from the viewpoint of minimizing welfare costs as follows: 1) policy authorities should
not suppress inﬂation aggressively if the cause of the default crisis is rooted in a decrease in
productivity. At a glance, this is not novel and is consistent with our intuition. However, we have
another prescription; 2) when an increase in government expenditure gives rise to default risk,
policy authorities should stabilize inﬂation, similar to a situation where there is no default risk. The
latter prescription may be glad tidings for policy authorities, such as central banks and government,
and both prescriptions suggest the importance of identiﬁcation of shocks hitting the economy with
default risk, although we do not discuss this topic; 3) welfare gains from conducting optimal
monetary and ﬁscal policy with awareness of default risk when there is an increase in government
expenditure are negligible; while 4) welfare gains from conducting optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policy with awareness of default risk when there is a decrease in productivity are nonnegligible.
To derive the above prescriptions, we analyze optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in an economy
with default risk. First, we develop a class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models in which default risk is introduced following Okano and Inagaki[17] who replicate Uribe’s[19]
ﬁscal theory of sovereign risk (FTSR) in the DSGE. Calvo pricing is assumed but the steady state is
distorted because tax is levied on the output. There are safe assets issued by households and risky
assets, namely government debt. The FTSR is applicable, which is derived from the government
budget constraint that is iterated forward and an appropriate transversality condition.2 Let us
suppose a decrease in the net present value of the ﬁscal surplus. Under the ﬁscal theory of price
level (FTPL), this increases the price level while there is the possibility of causing an increase in
the default rate, instead of an increase in the price level, under the FTSR. Second, we derive the
second-order approximated utility function, which includes not only a quadratic inﬂation term but
also a quadratic premium diﬀerence between the (virtual) government debt yield and its coupon
rate term, which we call simply the premium diﬀerence. This implies that the cost of default risk
is summarized as the premium diﬀerence.
1See ECB[10].
2The FTSR is based on the ﬁscal theory of price level (FTPL), which is advocated by Cochrane[6], Leeper[14]
and Woodford[20] and the net present value of the sum of ﬁscal surplus decides not only price level and inﬂation
but also the default rate.
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As well as explaining the reason for a quadratic term for the premium diﬀerence in the second-
order approximated utility function, we now expand our introduction to our model. In our setting,
there are both safe assets and risky assets, namely government debt, as mentioned. If households
purchase government debt, households’ optimal consumption schedule makes the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution corresponding to the inverse of the gross expected rate of return to
holding government debt, which consists of the government debt yield and the expected default
rate. Thus, households have to adjust their balance of government debt appropriately. By adjusting
the balance, which aﬀects the inverse of the gross expected rate of return on holding government
debt through changes in the government debt yield, optimal consumption schedule attains. If the
government debt coupon rate precisely corresponds to the government debt yield, such adjustment
is not needed. However, that is not necessarily common in an actual economy.3 Thus, this
adjustment of the balance of government debt, namely portfolio rebalancing, is essential. As shown
in the text, the premium diﬀerence is a function of the expected default rate, and the appearance
of the quadratic term on the period welfare cost function implies that the premium diﬀerence is the
cost of default risk. In other words, default risk generates a cost, forcing households to rebalance
their portfolio.
In this paper, we analyze both Exact and False policies. Under the exact policy, the exact
welfare cost function is minimized by policy authorities, the central bank, and the government
while under the false policy, they minimize a false welfare cost function. The exact welfare cost
function is derived exactly, assuming default risk, while the false welfare cost function is derived
without assuming default. There are two diﬀerences between the exact and the false welfare cost
functions, namely the target level of output and the existence of a quadratic term for the premium
diﬀerence. The diﬀerence in the target level of output between the exact and the false welfare cost
functions depends on the interest rate spread in the steady state, which decides the steady-state
value of the default rate. If the interest rate spread in the steady state is zero (the steady-state
value of the default rate is zero simultaneously), the target level of output in both welfare cost
functions is the same. Similarly, the existence of the quadratic term of the premium diﬀerence in
the exact welfare cost function depends on the interest rate spread in the steady state while that
term does not appear deﬁnitely on the false welfare cost function. If the interest rate spread in the
steady state is zero, the premium diﬀerence becomes zero and its quadratic term spontaneously
disappears from the exact welfare cost function. Those two diﬀerences depend on the interest rate
spread in the steady state. If the interest rate spread in the steady state is zero, the exact welfare
cost function precisely corresponds to the false welfare cost function. Because the interest rate
spread in the steady state decides the steady-state value of the default rate, it can be said that
default risk aﬀects the period welfare cost function, that is, it aﬀects the policy target. If there is
default risk, authorities have to pay attention to the target level of output and consider minimizing
the premium diﬀerence.
We resort to numerical analysis with plausible parameterization and compare the results under
the exact policy with the results under the false policy. The impulse response functions (IRFs)
imply that policy authorities should not suppress inﬂation aggressively if the causation of the de-
fault crisis is rooted in a decrease in productivity while policy authorities should stabilize inﬂation,
similar to a situation where there is no default risk if an increase in the government expenditure
3The government debt yield is consistent with the coupon rate on benchmark 10-year government bonds in Italy,
Spain, Germany, and the US. However, in Portugal, Ireland, and Greece, the yield is not consistent with the coupon
rate on the benchmark 10-year government bond. See Okano and InagakiOkanoInagaki17 for details.
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gives default risk. Furthermore, we also calculate ‘optimal’ monetary and ﬁscal policy rules. When
we calculate these, we choose the coeﬃcients on simple rules that are classes of monetary and ﬁscal
policy rules that replicate welfare costs brought about by the optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy.
Interestingly, there are no diﬀerences in our ﬁscal policy rule between exact and false policies to
an increase in government expenditure. However, when productivity decreases, the rules are quite
diﬀerent. Finally, we calculate welfare cost from adopting the exact policy rule and ﬁnd that the
welfare gains from conducting the exact policy are 64.4%. The gains are remarkable. Further-
more, concerning changes in productivity, the gains are 49.7%. However, when only government
expenditure hits an economy with default risk, the gains are just 1.0% and are negligible.
We now discuss the relationship between our analysis and previous work deriving policy implica-
tions in an economy with default risk. Corsetti and Dedola[7] develop a model for a sovereign debt
crisis driven by either self-fulﬁlling expectations or weak fundamentals, and analyze the mecha-
nism through which either conventional or unconventional monetary policy can preclude the former.
Their ﬁnding that swapping government debt for monetary liabilities can prevent self-fulﬁlling debt
crises is one of several unconventional monetary policies. Elsewhere, and similar to our analysis,
Bacchetta, Perazzi, and Wincoop[1] develop a class of DSGE models and analyze both conventional
and unconventional monetary policies. They ﬁnd that the central bank cannot credibly avoid a
self-fulﬁlling debt crisis. Okano and Hamano[16] and Okano and Inagaki[17] analyze stabilizing
inﬂation and suppressing default trade-oﬀs and they ﬁnd that these do not necessarily exist. Our
analysis diﬀers from this earlier body of work in several ways. Although Corsetti and Dedola[7] and
Bacchetta, Perazzi, and Wincoop[1] analyze monetary policy, they neither consider ﬁscal policy
nor how to use it as a stabilization or welfare cost-minimization tool. Thus, our purposes are not
identical in that we propose monetary and ﬁscal policies, whereas these related studies propose
monetary policy only to suppress default risk.4 Okano and Hamano[16] and Okano and Inagaki[17]
fail to derive implications for welfare costs while in this work we focus on welfare costs.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model, Section 3 derives
the welfare cost function and solves the linear quadratic (LQ) problem, Section 4 is devoted to
numerical analysis, and Section 5 calculates monetary and ﬁscal policy rules and analyzes welfare
costs. Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendices provide some technical information.
2 The Model
Following Okano and Inagaki[17], we introduce ﬁrms into Uribe’s[19] FTSR and develop a class
of DSGE models with nominal rigidities following Gali and Monacelli[13], although we assume a
closed economy.5 The default mechanism is quite similar to Uribe[19]. We follow Benigno[2] (an
earlier working paper version of Benigno[3]) to clarify the households’ choice of risky assets. The
household i on the interval i ∈ [0, 1] supplies labor and owns ﬁrms. Calvo pricing is adopted and we
assume that a tax is levied on output and distorts outcomes. Thus, monopolistic power remains,
and the steady state is distorted.
4Furthermore, they do not focus on ﬁscal policy (their models are unsuitable for analyzing ﬁscal policy regardless),
whereas our model can analyze and evaluate the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy.
5Following Ferrero[11], we introduce government into Gali and Monacelli[13]. In other words, the model is a
closed economy version of Okano[15].
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2.1 Government
We assume that the total government expenditure is given exogenously in each period by Gt ≡ 1
0
Gt (i)
ε−1
ε di
 ε
ε−1
where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution among goods. The ﬂow govern-
ment budget constraint is given by:
Bnt = R
G
t−1 (1− δt)B
n
t−1 −
 1
0
Pt (i) [τtYt (i)−Gt (i)] di,
where RGt ≡ RtΓ (−spt) denotes the government debt coupon rate, Rt ≡ 1 + rt denotes the
gross (risk-free) nominal interest rate, rt is the net interest rate, B
n
t is the nominal government
debt, δt is the default rate, spt ≡
SPt
SP
− 1 is the percentage deviation of the (real) ﬁscal surplus
from its steady-state value, SPt ≡ τtYt − Gt denotes the (real) ﬁscal surplus, and τt denotes the
tax rate. Note that we deﬁne Yt ≡
 1
0
Yt (i)
ε−1
ε di
 ε
ε−1
where Yt denotes (aggregated) output.
Because government expenditure is given exogenously, ﬁscal policy consists of choosing the mix
between taxes and the one-period nominal debt with default risk to ﬁnance the exogenous process
of government expenditure.
Here, we discuss the government debt coupon rate RGt ≡ RtΓ (−spt), where Γ
′ (−spt) > 0 by
assumption. Our assumption implies that the government decides the government debt coupon
rate depending on its ﬁscal situation, such that if the ﬁscal situation worsens, the government
increases the coupon rate. Note that the government debt coupon rate RGt is not the government
debt yield, which is fully endogenized. In our setting, the government debt yield is decided by
households’ intertemporal optimal condition, namely the Euler equation. Thus, the government
debt yield is decided endogenously, although the government debt coupon rate depends on our
assumption.
As mentioned, the function Γ (−spt) is hinted at by Benigno[2], who develops a two-country
model with imperfect ﬁnancial integration, although the details are somewhat diﬀerent from
Benigno[2]. Benigno[2] assumes that households in the home country face a burden in interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets. As borrowers, households in the home country will be charged a premium
on the foreign interest rate; as lenders, they will receive remuneration less than the foreign inter-
est rate. Following his setting, Benigno[2] assumes Γ′ (·) < 0, which implies that the higher the
foreign country’s government debt, the lower the remuneration for holding the foreign country’s
government debt.6 However, in contrast, our setting implies that the lower the ﬁscal surplus, the
less the remuneration for holding government debt owing to default, which in turn harms capital
and makes households hesitate to hold government debt. The government has to pay additional
remuneration for holding government debt, which provides households with a motivation for doing
so. Thus, we assume that Γ′ (·) > 0. That is, the lower the ﬁscal surplus, the higher the interest
rate multiplier, and vice versa.
Another assumption that diﬀers from Benigno[2] is that Γ (·) is a function of the ﬁscal surplus,
while Benigno[2] assumes that it is a function of current government debt with an interest payment;
that is, RtBt. Our setting for Γ (·) follows Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mueller[8] indirectly.
Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mueller[8] assume that the higher the ﬁscal deﬁcit, the greater the
probability of default, and vice versa. If it is given that the higher the probability of default, the
6Benigno[2] observes that this function, which depends only on the level of real government bonds in his setting,
captures the costs of undertaking positions in the international asset market or the existence of intermediaries in
the foreign asset market.
4
higher the government debt coupon rate, our assumption that Γ (·) is a decreasing function of the
ﬁscal surplus is consistent with their analysis because the assumption implies that the higher the
ﬁscal surplus, the higher the government debt coupon rate. That is, if it is given that the higher
the probability of default, the higher the government debt coupon rate, it can be said that we
indirectly assume that the lower the ﬁscal surplus, the higher the default rate, which is similar to
Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mueller[8].7
It is worth mentioning here Schabert[18], who argues that the equilibrium allocation cannot be
determined if the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way while if money supply
is controlled, the equilibrium allocation can uniquely be determined under Uribe’s[19] FTSR. We
adopt Uribe’s[19] FTSR while we do not introduce money into our model. However, this does not
deﬁnitely imply that the equilibrium allocation cannot be determined because we follow Benigno[2],
as mentioned. Because we follow Benigno[2], the households’ choice of risky assets is determined
uniquely, thus the equilibrium allocation can uniquely be determined.
The log-linearized deﬁnition of the ﬁscal surplus is given by:
spt = ςτ τˆt + ςτyt −
ςτσG
τ
gt, (1)
where ςτ ≡
τ
SP
Y
denotes the tax revenue elasticity and σG ≡
G
Y
denotes the steady-state share of
the government expenditure to output, and τˆt ≡
dτt
τ
denotes the percentage deviation of the tax
rate from its steady-state value. We simply refer to the percentage deviation of the tax rate from
its steady-state value τˆt as the tax gap.
By solving cost-minimization problems, the optimal allocation of generic goods is given by
Yt (i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
−ε
Yt and Gt (i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
−ε
Gt, and the previous ﬂow government budget con-
straint can be rewritten as:
Bnt = R
G
t−1 (1− δt)B
n
t−1 − PtSPt,
where
Pt ≡
 1
0
Pt (i)
1−ε
dh
 1
1−ε
(2)
denotes the price level. Dividing both sides of the equality by Pt yields:
Bt = R
G
t−1 (1− δt)Bt−1Π
−1
t − SPt, (3)
with Πt ≡
Pt
Pt−1
being the gross inﬂation rate. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side (RHS)
corresponds to the amount of redemption with the nominal interest payment and shows that the
lower the past ﬁscal surplus, the higher the interest payments, and the higher the default rate, the
lower the redemption, and vice versa.
Log-linearizing Eq. (3) yields:
bt =
τ
β (τ + φςτσB)
rˆGt−1 −
φςτσB
β (τ + φςτσB)
δˆt +
τ
β (τ + φςτσB)
bt−1 −
τ
β (τ + φςτσB)
πt −
τ
ςτσB
spt, (4)
with rˆGt ≡
dRGt
RG
where δˆt ≡
dδt
δ
denotes the default gap.
7Our setting on Γ (·) follows Okano and Inagaki[17] who analyze whether a ﬁscal deﬁcit or government debt with
interest payment increases the interest rate multiplier Γ (·) using Greek data. These data imply that the ﬁscal deﬁcit
but not government debt with interest payment increases Γ (·).
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Here, we show that the log-linearized deﬁnition of the government debt coupon rate is given
by:
rˆGt = rˆt − φspt. (5)
2.2 Households
2.2.1 The First-Order Necessary Conditions (FONCs) for Households
A representative household’s preference is given by:
U ≡ E0
	
∞

t=0
βtUt

, (6)
where Ut ≡ lnCt −
1
1+ψN
1+ψ
t denotes the period utility, Et is the expectation conditional on the
information set at period t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, Ct is the consumption
index, Nt ≡
 1
0
Nt (i) dh is the hours of labor, and ψ is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply.
The consumption index of the continuum of diﬀerentiated goods is deﬁned as follows:
Ct ≡
 1
0
Ct (i)
ε−1
ε di
 ε
ε−1
, (7)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods.
The maximization of Eq. (6) is subject to a sequence of intertemporal budget constraints of
the form:
Rt−1D
n
t−1 +R
G
t−1B
n
t−1 (1− δt) +WtNt + PRt ≥
 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i) di+D
n
t + B
n
t , (8)
where Dnt denotes the safe assets issued by households, Wt is the nominal wage, and PRt denotes
proﬁts from the ownership of ﬁrms. Furthermore, we deﬁne V as the steady-state value of any
variables Vt and vt as the percentage deviation of Vt from its steady-state value.
By solving cost-minimization problems for households, we have the optimal allocation of ex-
penditures as follows:
Ct (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
−ε
Ct. (9)
Once we account for Eq. (9), the intertemporal budget constraint can be rewritten as:
Rt−1D
n
t−1 +R
G
t−1B
n
t−1 (1− δt) +WtNt + PRt ≥ PtCt +D
n
t +B
n
t .
The remaining optimality conditions for the household’s problem are given by:
βEt

PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1

=
1
Rt
, (10)
which is the intertemporal optimality condition, namely the Euler equation, and
CtN
ψ
t =
Wt
Pt
, (11)
which is the standard intratemporal optimality condition.
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There is another intertemporal optimality condition depicting households’ motivation to hold
government debt with default risk. This is obtained by diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian by govern-
ment nominal debt and is given by:
λt = βR
H
t Et [λt+1 (1− δt+1)] , (12)
with λt = (PtCt)
−1
where RHt ≡ Rt

Γ (−spt) +BtΓ
′ (−spt)SP
−1

is one of the earning rates or
marginal revenue of holding government debt that can be interpreted as the (gross) government
debt yield (excluding the default risk) requested by households. The deﬁnition of government debt
yield RHt implies that household demand for government debt , which establishes the government
debt yield discounting default risk RHt Et (1− δt+1), corresponds to the inverse of the marginal rate
of consumption, namely Rt, as long as the additional interest payment for holding government
debt is not suﬃcient to realize the optimal consumption schedule from holding government debt.
Hereafter, we dub RHt the government debt yield for short.
In fact, log-linearizing Eqs. (10) and (12) and combining them, we have:
rˆt = rˆ
H
t − δEt

δˆt+1

, (13)
with rˆt ≡
dRt
R
and rˆHt ≡
dRHt
RH
being the nominal interest gap and the government debt yield gap,
respectively. Eq. (13) shows that the marginal rate of substitution for consumption is the same
for households holding either (real) safe assets Dt or (real) government debt Bt because both Rt
and RHt Et (1− δt+1) equal the marginal rate of substitution. That is, the consumption schedule is
the same whether households hold safe assets Dt or government debt Bt.
Let us deﬁne rˆSt ≡ rˆ
H
t − rˆt, which is the interest rate spread gap for holding government debt,
namely risky assets. Then, Eq. (13) can be rewritten as:
rˆSt = δEt

δˆt+1

, (14)
where σB ≡
B
Y
denotes the steady-state share of government debt to output. Eq. (14) shows that
the higher the expected default rate, the higher the interest rate spread, and vice versa.
Log-linearizing the deﬁnition of government debt yield RHt , we have:
rˆSt = −
φ (τ + γςτσB)
τ + φςτσB
spt +
φςτσB
τ + φςτσB
bt, (15)
where φ ≡ Γ′ (0) denotes the interest rate spread in the steady state and γ ≡ Γ
′′(0)
Γ′(0) denotes the
elasticity of the interest rate spread to a one-percent change in the ﬁscal deﬁcit in the steady
state. Following Benigno[2], we deﬁne the interest rate spread for government debt φ and assume
Γ (0) = 1. The elasticity γ is an unfamiliar parameter, and we assume | Γ′ (·) |<| Γ′′ (·) |; thus,
γ > 1. Our assumption implies that a decrease in the ﬁscal surplus increases the government debt
coupon rate via an increase in the interest rate multiplier, and vice versa, and that changes in the
government debt coupon rate are larger than the changes in the ﬁscal surplus in absolute value.8
The ﬁrst term on the RHS of Eq. (15) has a negative sign and implies that an increase in the
ﬁscal surplus decreases the government debt yield, and vice versa. This is intuitively consistent
because an increase in ﬁscal surplus decreases the interest rate multiplier. The second term on the
RHS of Eq. (15) has a positive sign. This shows that the government debt yield is an increasing
8Our assumption γ > 1 is supported by the data. See Okano and Inagaki[17] for details.
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function of government debt. An increase in government debt coincides with a decrease in the
ﬁscal surplus, and vice versa. Thus, this positive sign in the second term is consistent with the
negative sign in the ﬁrst term.
2.2.2 Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Risk
The appropriate transversality condition for government debt is given by:
lim
j→∞
βt+j+1Et

RGt+j (1− δt+j+1)
Pt+jBt+j
Pt+j+1

= 0.
By iterating the second equality in Eq. (3) forward, plugging Eq. (10) into this iterated equality,
and imposing the appropriate transversality condition for government debt, we have:
C−1t R
G
t−1Bt−1Π
−1
t (1− δt) = C
−1
t SPt + β
RHt
RGt
Et

C−1t+1SPt+1

+ β2Et

RHt
RGt
RHt+1
RGt+1
C−1t+2SPt+2

+ · · · , (16)
which roughly shows that the burden of government debt redemption with interest payment in
terms of consumption, or the left-hand side (LHS), corresponds to the expected sum of the dis-
counted value of the ﬁscal surplus in terms of consumption, or the RHS, because of the transver-
sality condition. Here,
RHt
RG
t
and so forth appear on the RHS. An increase in the government debt
coupon rate RGt then worsens the ﬁscal situation through the increase in the interest payment.
Thus, RGt is the denominator. An increase in the government debt yield facilitates the purchase of
government debt even though consumption decreases. A decrease in consumption then improves
the ﬁscal situation because the decrease in consumption increases the ﬁscal surplus in terms of
consumption. Thus, RHt appears as the numerator.
Eq. (16) can be rewritten as:
δt = 1−

RRt−1
−1∞
k=0
k
h=0 β
kEt

RRt+h−1C
−1
t+kSPt+k

C−1t R
G
t−1Bt−1Π
−1
t
, (17)
where RRt ≡
RHt
RG
t
denotes the (gross) premium diﬀerence between the government debt yield and
its coupon rate. Eq. (17) is our FTSR and implies that an increase in inﬂation does not necessarily
occur even if the government becomes insolvent, and vice versa, similar to Uribe[19]. Not only
inﬂation but also default can mitigate the burden of government debt redemption with interest
payment. Suppose that the price level is constant and there is no inﬂation. In this situation, if the
net present value of the ﬁscal surplus in terms of consumption (the numerator) is about to fall below
the burden of government debt redemption with interest payment in terms of consumption (the
denominator), the second term on the RHS is less than unity. Simultaneously, the LHS exceeds zero;
that is, default occurs. In other words, if the government becomes insolvent while the price level
is strictly stable, default is inevitable. Uribe[19] shows that there is a trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
inﬂation and suppressing default (hereafter the SI—SD trade-oﬀ) by introducing default, namely
default risk, into the central equation of the FTPL. Similar to Uribe[19], at ﬁrst glance, Eq. (17)
also implies that there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ. Furthermore, he calibrates his model and compares
this with the monetary policy rule that stabilizes inﬂation with the interest rate peg. Under the
interest rate peg, the interest rate on risky assets corresponds to the risk-free asset interest rate
pegged to the steady-state rate. This calibration shows that default ceases just one period after
the shock decreasing the ﬁscal surplus, even though default continues under a monetary policy
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rule after the shock. This implies that a monetary policy rule to stabilize inﬂation includes the
unwelcome possibility of magnifying default risk, and this calls for an interest rate peg to counter
default. Although Uribe[19] ignores the welfare perspective of these actions, his policy implications
are persuasive. Paying attention only to Eq. (17), which is similar to that in Uribe’s[19] model,
we seem to obtain policy implications quite similar to those in Uribe[19].
We now present the relationship between our FTSR, namely Eq. (17), and the FTPL. If there
is neither default risk nor an interest rate multiplier in Eq. (17), Eq. (17) reduces to the following
because RGt = R
H
t = Rt:
1 =
∞
k=0 β
kEt

C−1t+kSPt+k

C−1t Rt−1Bt−1Π
−1
t
, (18)
which is our version of the FTPL. On the RHS in this equality, the numerator is the net present
value of the sum of the ﬁscal surplus in terms of consumption, and the denominator is the burden
of the government debt redemption with interest payment in terms of consumption divided by
inﬂation. The LHS is unity. If solvency worsens, the price level increases, that is, inﬂation occurs,
such that the burden of government debt redemption is mitigated. For now, we introduce default
risk, and this mechanism is no longer fully applicable, as Eq. (17) implies.
2.2.3 Relationship between Default Rate and Fiscal Surplus
By leading Eq. (17) one period and plugging this into Eq. (17) itself, we can rewrite Eq. (17) as
a second-order diﬀerential equation as follows:
δt = 1−
1
RGt−1Π
−1
t Bt−1

SPt + βEt

Ct
Ct+1
Π−1t+1

RHt (1− δt+1)Bt

. (19)
In Eq. (19), the current government debt Bt appears in the second term on the RHS and the sign
is negative. That is, a decrease in current government debt increases the default rate, and vice
versa. Why is the sign of government debt Bt in the second term on the RHS negative? This stems
from the transversality condition for government debt. Because of the transversality condition, Eq.
(17) and its second-order diﬀerential version Eq. (19) are strictly applicable. That is, once issued,
government debt must be redeemed. Otherwise, the burden of redemption is mitigated by default
or inﬂation. To keep Eq. (17), once government debt is issued, the ﬁscal surplus must be improved
while newly issued government debt is about to reduce the ﬁscal surplus. Because the ﬁscal surplus
must improve to redeem debt, the default rate declines as a result of an improvement in the ﬁscal
surplus when government debt increases. Thus, the sign is negative.
Log-linearizing Eq. (19) yields:
ct = Et (ct+1)− rˆ
H
t +
φςτσB
τ
Et

δˆt+1

+ Et (πt+1)− bt +
τ + ςτσB
ςτσB
rˆGt−1 −
φςτσB
β (τ + φςτσB)
δˆt
−
τ + ςτσB
ςτσB
πt +
τ + ςτσB
ςτσB
bt−1 −
τ
ςτσB
spt, (20)
which is our log-linearized Euler equation.
2.3 Firms
This subsection outlines the production, price setting, marginal cost, and features of the ﬁrms,
which are quite similar to Gali and Monacelli[13], although here the tax is levied on ﬁrm sales and
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is not constant.9
A typical ﬁrm in each country produces a diﬀerentiated good with a linear technology repre-
sented by the production function:
Yt (i) = AtNt (i) ,
where At denotes productivity.
By combining the production function and the optimal allocation for goods Yt (i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
−ε
Yt,
we have an aggregate production function relating to aggregate employment as follows:
Nt =
YtZt
At
, (21)
where Zt ≡
 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
−ε
di denotes price dispersion.
Log-linearizing Eq. (21) yields:
nt = yt − at. (22)
We assume that productivity follows an AR(1) process, namely Et (at+1) = ρAat, similar to gov-
ernment expenditure. Zt disappears in Eq. (17) because of o

ξ2

.
Each ﬁrm is a monopolistic producer of one of the diﬀerentiated goods. Each ﬁrm sets its
prices Pt (i) taking as given Pt and Ct. We assume that ﬁrms set prices in a staggered fashion,
Calvo pricing, according to which each seller has the opportunity to change its price with a given
probability 1 − θ, where an individual ﬁrm’s probability of reoptimizing in any given period is
independent of the time elapsed since it last reset its price. When a ﬁrm has the opportunity to
set a new price in period t, it does so to maximize the expected discounted value of its net proﬁts.
The FONCs for ﬁrms are given by:
P˜t =
Et
∞
k=0 θ
kβkY˜t+k
ε
ε−1Pt+kMCt+k

Et
∞
k=0 θ
kβkY˜t+k
 , (23)
whereMCt ≡
Wt
(1−τt)PtAt
denotes the real marginal cost, Y˜t+k ≡

P˜t
Pt+k
−ε
Yt+k denotes the demand
for goods when ﬁrms choose a new price, and P˜t denotes the newly set prices. Note that we assume
that the government levies a tax on ﬁrm sales.
By log-linearizing Eq. (23), we have:
πt = βEt (πt+1) + κmct, (24)
with κ ≡ (1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
being the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). Eq. (24) is
the fundamental equality of our NKPC.
Substituting Eq. (11) into the deﬁnition of the real marginal cost yields:
MCt =
CtN
ψ
t
(1− τt)At
. (25)
Note that the marginal cost in the steady state, which is the inverse of a constant markup, is
smaller than one, while the gross tax rate 1− τ is deﬁnitely smaller than one. In such a case, the
9Unlike our setting, Gali and Monacelli[13] assume that under constant employment subsidies, monopolistic
power completely disappears.
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steady-state wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal utility of consumption
is not unity. That is, monopolistic power remains because it is unable to be completely absorbed
through taxation. As we discuss later, we need to derive our welfare criteria following Benigno and
Woodford[5] because monopolistic power is no longer removed completely, and the steady state is
distorted.
Log-linearizing Eq. (25) yields:
mct = ct + ψnt +
τ
1− τ
τˆt − at. (26)
2.4 Equilibrium
The market-clearing condition requires:
Yt (i) = Ct (i) +Gt (i) ,
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t. By plugging the optimal allocation for generic goods including Eq. (8)
into this market-clearing condition, we have:
Yt = Ct +Gt. (27)
By log-linearizing Eq. (27), we obtain:
yt = σCct + σGgt, (28)
where σC ≡ 1− σG denotes the steady-state ratio of consumption to output.
3 Welfare Costs and the LQ Problem
3.1 Derivation of the Welfare Cost Function
Following Gali[12], the second-order approximated utility function is given by:
∞

t=0
βtE0

Ut − U
UCC

=
∞

t=0
βtE0

Φ
σC
yt

−
∞

t=0
βtE0

(1− Φ) (1 + ψ)
σC2
y2t −
(1− Φ) (1 + ψ)
σC
ytat
+
Λπ
2
π2t

+ t.i.p. + o

ξ3

, (29)
with Λπ ≡
(1−Φ)ε
σCκ
where t.i.p. denotes the terms independent of policy, o

ξ3

are the terms of
order three or higher, and Φ ≡ 1− 1−τε
ε−1
denotes the steady-state wedge between the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor. On the RHS,
there is a linear term
∞
t=0 β
tE0

Φ
σC
yt

generating the welfare reversal, which must be eliminated
to avoid welfare reversal.
To eliminate this linear term, we follow Benigno andWoodford[4] and Benigno andWoodford[5].
By using the second-order approximated AS equation Eq. (23), the second-order approximated
deﬁnition of the ﬁscal surplus SPt, the second-order approximated deﬁnition of the premium
diﬀerence RRt , the second-order approximated market clearing condition Eq. (27), and the second-
order approximated government solvency condition Eq. (17), we have:
∞

t=0
βtE0

Φ
σC
yt

= −
∞

t=0
βtE0

Ω˜1y
2
t − 2yt

Ω2gt + Ω˜3at

+
Λr
2

rˆRt
2
+Υ0 + t.i.p. + o

ξ3

,
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where rˆRt ≡
dRRt
RR
denotes the premium diﬀerence, Υ0 ≡ Θ1 (1− β − δ)
−1
Wˆ0+Θ2κ
−1V0 denotes the
transitory component, V0 denotes the initial value of the second-order approximated AS equation,
W0 denotes the initial value of the second-order approximated government solvency condition,
and Ω˜1, Ω2, Ω˜3, Ω4 are complicated building blocks of parameters with Wˆt ≡
Wt−Wt−1
Wt−1
, Λr ≡
Θ1β[1+(γ−1)2]
(1−β−δ)(γ−1)2
, Θ1 ≡
(1−β−δ)τΦ
Ξ0
, Θ2 ≡ −
Φ(1+2ωg)ωφ(1−τ)
Ξ0
, ωφ ≡ 1 − β (1− φ) −
φςτσB
τ+φςτσB
, and Ξ0
being complicated building blocks of parameters.
Plugging the previous expression into Eq. (29) yields:
∞

t=0
βtE0

Ut − U
UCC

=
∞

t=0
βtE0 (Lt) + Υ0 + t.i.p. + o

ξ3

,
which is a second-order approximated utility function and the linear term is appropriately elimi-
nated, where
Lt ≡
Λy
2
(yt − y
∗
t )
2
+
Λπ
2
π2t +
Λr
2

rˆRt
2
(30)
denotes the period welfare cost function, and
y∗t ≡
Ω2
Ω1
gt +
Ω3
Ω1
at (31)
denotes the eﬃcient level of output with Λy ≡ 2Ω1, Ω1 ≡ Ω˜1 +
(1+ψ)(1−Φ)
2σC
.
The period welfare cost function Eq. (30) has distinctive features. To clarify its distinctive
features, we derive the period welfare cost function by using the second-order approximated gov-
ernment solvency condition, which is derived from Eq. (18). Recall that Eq. (18) is our version
of the FTPL and can be derived from the government solvency condition Eq. (17) by assuming
that there is neither default risk nor an interest rate multiplier. The period welfare cost function
derived by using the second-order approximated government solvency condition, which is derived
from Eq. (18), is given by:
L
f
t =
Λfy
2

yt − y
f
t
2
+
Λπ
2
π2t . (32)
This is analogous to the period welfare cost function derived by Benigno and Woodford[4] where
y
f
t ≡
Ωf
2
Ωf
1
gt+
Ωf
3
Ωf
1
at denotes the eﬃcient level of output when there is no default risk with Λ
f
y ≡ 2Ω
f
1 ,
Ωf1 ≡ Ω˜
f
1 +
(1+ψ)(1−Φ)
2σC
, Ωf3 ≡ Ω˜
f
3 +
(1+ψ)(1−Φ)
2σC
, and Ωf2 being a complicated block of parameters.
There is no quadratic term of rˆRt . Λfy replaces Λy and the target level of output is not y
∗
t but y
f
t
in Eq. (30).
3.2 Welfare Costs in an Economy with Sovereign Risk
The most notable feature of welfare costs in an economy with default risk, namely Eq. (30), is the
quadratic term of the premium diﬀerence between the government debt yield and the government
debt coupon rate rˆRt , which is the third term on the RHS. The appearance of this term suggests
that there is an opportunity cost of holding government debt. When households hold government
debt, they can obtain interest income that is not necessarily at the government debt coupon rate
rGt but may be at the government debt yield rate r
H
t . To choose the optimal consumption schedule
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Eq. (12), households have to maneuver their government debt position Bt satisfying the deﬁnition
of the (gross) government debt yield as follows:
RHt = Rt

Γ (−spt) +BtΓ
′ (−spt)SP
−1

= RGt +RtBtΓ
′ (−spt)SP
−1.
As shown in the previous expression, the government debt coupon rate does not necessarily cor-
respond to the government debt yield and households have to abandon income at the government
debt coupon rate but obtain income at the government debt yield on their own government debt.
Thus, there is an opportunity cost to maneuvering the government debt position. If they neglect to
maneuver, households can no longer choose an optimal consumption schedule, resulting in welfare
costs. This is the reason there is a quadratic of the premium diﬀerence between the government
debt yield and the government debt coupon rate rˆRt in Eq. (30).
The appearance of the quadratic of the premium diﬀerence between the government debt yield
and the government debt coupon rate in Eq. (30) depends on default risk. The third term on the
RHS in Eq. (30) can be rewritten as:
Λr

rRt
2
= ΛδEt

δˆt+1 − δˆ
∗
t+1
2
,
because
rˆRt =
φςτσB
τ
Et

δˆt+1 − δˆ
∗
t+1

, (33)
which is derived by using Eqs. (5) and (14) with Λδ ≡ Λrφ
2

ςτσB
τ
2
where δˆ∗t ≡ −
τ
ςτ ςB
spt−1
denotes the target level of the default rate. The previous expression shows the welfare costs
stemming from the third term of Eq. (30) to be the welfare costs of the deviation of the expected
default gap from its target level Et

δˆ∗t+1

corresponding to the (percentage deviation of) ﬁscal
deﬁcit from its steady-state value −spt. In addition, the previous expression shows that the higher
the steady-state value of the interest spread φ, the higher the weights on the deviation of the
expected default gap from its target level Λδ. Then, we have to pay attention to the steady-state
value of interest spread φ, which determines the steady-state value of the default rate because
δ =
φςτσB
τ + φςτσB
.
That is, the higher the steady-state value of the interest spread, the higher the steady-state value of
the default, and vice versa. Because of that, the higher the steady-state value of the interest spread
φ, the higher the weights on the deviation of the expected default gap from its target level Λδ, the
higher the steady-state value of the default rate δ, and the higher the weights on the deviation of
the expected default gap from its target level Λδ. In addition, when there is no interest spread
in the steady state, which means that the steady-state value of the default rate is zero, Λδ = 0 is
applied and the third term in Eq. (30) Λr2

rˆRt
2
disappears.
Other distinctive features of Eq. (30) as against Eq. (32) are that the weights on the output
deviation from its target level Λy replace Λf and the target level output y
∗
t replaces y
f
t . While Λ
f
y
in Eq. (32) does not depend on the steady-state value of the interest spread φ, Λy depends on φ.
When φ = 0, Λy = Λ
f
y is applied. That is, the diﬀerence of the weights on the output deviation
from its target level depends on the steady-state value of the interest spread. In Eq. (30), the
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target level output y∗t replaces y
f
t and y
∗
t depends on φ, although y
f
t does not depend on it. When
φ = 0, y∗t = y
f
t . Thus, when φ = 0 in which the steady-state value of the default rate is zero,
namely δ = 0, Eq. (32) boils down to Eq. (30), that is,
L∗t = L
f
t
is applied. If there is no default risk, the welfare cost function is analogous to one derived by
Benigno and Woodford[4] who do not assume the default risk. Thus, it can be said that default
risk changes the form of the welfare cost function.
3.3 The LQ Problem
The policy authorities minimize Eq. (30) or Eq. (32) for all t subject to Eqs. (1), (4), (5), (14), (15),
(20), (22), (24), (26), and (28) and select the sequence

yt, πt, rˆ
G
t , rˆt, rˆ
H
t , ct, bt,mct, nt, spt, τˆt, δˆt
∞
t=0
.
We designate the policy minimizing Eq. (30) the ‘exact’ policy because there is default risk and
policy authorities recognize default risk, while we designate the policy minimizing Eq. (32) the
‘false’ policy because there is default risk but policy authorities do not recognize default risk. Eqs.
(30) and (32) are not only distinguished by the quadratic term of the premium diﬀerence rˆRt but
also by the weights on the output deviation from its target level and the target level output. Com-
paring the outcome of policy minimizing Eq. (30) with minimizing Eq. (30) without the quadratic
term of the premium diﬀerence, we cannot analyze how default risk aﬀects the outcome of the
optimal policy. We have to consider not only the quadratic term of the premium diﬀerence but
also the weights on the output deviation from its target level and the target level output. Thus,
we compare the ‘exact’ policy, which minimizes Eq. (30) with the ‘false’ policy, which minimizes
Eq. (32).
Under the exact policy, the policy authorities minimize Eq. (30), while they minimize Eq. (32)
under the false policy. In the following, we introduce some FONCs that are worth discussing.
The FONCs for the output are given by:
Λyyt = ςτρ7,t + ρ8,t − ρ10,t + Λyy
∗
t , (34)
Λfyyt = ςτρ7,t + ρ8,t − ρ10,t + Λ
f
yy
f
t , (35)
where ρ7,t, ρ8,t, and ρ10,t are Lagrange multipliers on Eqs. (1), (22), and (28), respectively. Eq.
(34) is the FONC under the exact policy and shows that the target level output is the eﬃcient level
of output. Eq. (35) is the FONC under the false policy and shows that the target level output is
the eﬃcient level of output when there is no default risk.10
The FONC for inﬂation is given by:
Λππt = −
τ + ςτσB
ςτσB
ρ1,t +
1
β
ρ1,t−1 − (ρ2,t − ρ2,t−1)−
τ
β (τ + φςτσB)
ρ6,t, (36)
where ρ1,t and ρ6,t are Lagrange multipliers on Eqs. (20) and (4), respectively. Because of commit-
ment, lagged Lagrange multipliers appear in Eq. (36). Eq. (36) is common to both the exact and
false policies. In Eqs. (34), (35), and (36), ρ2,t appears and those equalities imply that inﬂation
is stabilized by stabilizing output (or stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap or the diﬀerence
10To derive Eqs. (34) and (35), we use the FONCs for the marginal cost and the hours of labor and eliminate
Lagrange multipliers on Eq. (22) ρ8,t.
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between output and the target level output). This mechanism is similar to others in the literature
on optimal monetary policy and is common to both the exact and false policies.
The FONCs for the government coupon gap are given by:
Λr rˆ
G
t = Λr rˆ
H
t − ρ5,t +
β (τ + ςτσB)
ςτσB
ρ1,t+1 +
τ
ςτσB
ρ6,t, (37)
0 = −ρ5,t +
β (τ + ςτσB)
ςτσB
ρ1,t+1 +
τ
ςτσB
ρ6,t, (38)
where ρ5,t is a Lagrange multiplier on Eq. (3) and Eqs. (37) and (38) are the FONCs under the
exact and false policies, respectively. Eq. (37) implies that the policy authorities have to minimize
the premium diﬀerence rˆRt ≡ rˆ
H
t − rˆ
G
t to minimize the welfare costs, although Eq. (38) implies
that there is no explicit incentive to minimize it.
The FONCs for the government debt yield gap are given by:
Λr rˆ
H
t = Λr rˆ
G
t − ρ1,t + ρ3,t − ρ4,t, (39)
0 = −ρ1,t + ρ3,t − ρ4,t, (40)
where ρ4,t. Eqs. (39) and (42) are the FONCs under the exact and false policies, respectively. Eq.
(39) implies that the policy authorities have to minimize the premium diﬀerence rˆRt ≡ rˆ
H
t − rˆ
G
t to
minimize the welfare costs, although Eq. (42) implies that there is no explicit incentive to minimize
it.
4 Numerical Analysis
4.1 Parameterization
We run a series of dynamic simulations and adopt the following benchmark parameterization. The
calibrated parameters are shown in Table 1.11 In addition, we assume that productivity at and
government expenditure gt follow AR(1) processes and that persistence is 0.9.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions
We next discuss the IRFs. Figs. 1 and 2 show the IRFs to a unit decrease in productivity
and to a unit increase in government expenditure, respectively. First, we discuss IRFs of a one-
percent decrease in productivity (Fig. 1). A decrease in the productivity decreases the target level
output under both policies as shown in the deﬁnition of the target level output. Although target
level output depends on the steady-state value of the interest spread under the exact policy, the
diﬀerence in the target level output can be ignored (Panel 3). Under the false policy, the tax gap
falls enough to boost output although under the exact policy it does not (Panel 9). As a result,
output and the welfare-relevant output gap under the exact policy fall more under the exact policy,
while under the false policy, output corresponds approximately to its target level and the welfare-
relevant output gap is close to zero (Panels 1 and 2). Through stabilizing the welfare-relevant
output gap, inﬂation is stabilized under the false policy but not under the exact policy (Panel
4). This is why we have a prescription for conducting monetary and ﬁscal policy that 1) policy
11Creedy and Gremmell[?] report that the tax revenue elasticity ranges from 0.5 to 1 and we choose 1 as the tax
revenue elasticity ςτ .
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authorities should not suppress inﬂation aggressively if the causation of default crisis is rooted by
a decrease in productivity (see Section 1).
On the one hand, a drastic decrease in the tax gap worsens the ﬁscal surplus under the false
policy, but on the other, under the exact policy, it does not because the tax gap is not lowered
very much. Here, the ﬁscal surplus under the exact policy has an important role in stabilizing the
premium diﬀerence, which is:
rˆRt ≡ rˆ
H
t − rˆ
G
t
= rˆHt − rˆt −

rˆGt − rˆt

= rˆSt + φspt
= −
φςτσB (γ − φ)
τ + φςτσB
spt +
φςτσB
τ + φςτσB
bt
=
φςτσB
τ
Et

δˆt+1 − δ
∗
t+1

.
Substituting Eq. (15) into the third line, we show that an increase in the ﬁscal surplus and a
decrease in the government debt decreases the premium diﬀerence, as long as the steady-state
value of the interest rate spread is not high. Because inﬂation is not so stabilized, government debt
decreases more under the exact policy, as shown in Eq. (4) (Panel 10). Because of a small decrease
in the tax gap, the eﬀect of a decrease in the ﬁscal surplus is not severe under the exact policy
(Panels 7 and 9). Thus, the premium diﬀerence is more aggressively stabilized under the exact
policy although it rises considerably under the false policy (Panel 5). As shown in line 5 in the
previous expression, the smaller the premium diﬀerence, the smaller the deviation of the expected
default rate from its target level. Reﬂecting this fact, the default gap is well stabilized under the
exact policy although the default gap does not converge immediately under the false policy (Panel
6).
The default gap under the exact policy, which rises sharply after the shock, is consistent with
Uribe[19]’s result. Uribe analyzes the ‘interest rate peg’ monetary policy that pegs the nominal
interest rate for risky assets to that for safe assets under an economy with default risk. His interest
peg policy raises the default rate sharply after an exogenous negative ﬁscal surplus shock although
a rise in the default rate is stabilized immediately. His interest peg policy corresponds to the policy
minimizing the interest spread for risky assets rˆSt in our paper. As Eq. (14) implies, the policy
minimizing the interest spread for risky assets is equivalent to the policy minimizing the expected
default gap Et

δˆt+1

. If the policy authorities adopt the policy minimizing the interest spread for
risky assets, and they succeed in doing so, the expected default rate becomes zero. Thus, although
a rise in the default gap immediately after the shock is inevitable, the default gap then becomes
zero. Our exact policy has a feature minimizing the default gap itself, as the previous expression
implies, and the default gap rises sharply after the shock and converges immediately, although it
takes time to fully converge. This explains why our result is consistent with Uribe[19].
Next, we discuss the IRFs of a one-percent increase in government expenditure (Fig. 2).
An increase in government expenditure increases the target level output and applies to inﬂation
pressure (Panel 3). To stabilize inﬂation, the tax gap is hiked under both exact and false policies
although the ﬁscal surplus worsens. As a result, inﬂation is well stabilized under both exact and
false policies (Panel 4). This is why we have a prescription for conducting monetary and ﬁscal
policy that 2) when an increase in government expenditure gives default risk, policy authorities
should stabilize inﬂation, similar to a situation where there is no default risk (see Section 1). Due
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to a decrease in the ﬁscal surplus, the premium diﬀerence increases under both policies (Panel 5).
The ﬂuctuation of the default gap under both policies is almost the same and not very severe even
under the false policy (Panel 6). The reason the ﬂuctuation of the default gap is not very severe
is that the interest spread for risky assets rSt does not diﬀer much between the exact and false
policies. As shown in Eq. (15), the interest spread for risky assets depends on the government debt
and the ﬂuctuation of the government debt under the false policy is close to that under the exact
policy (Panel 10). Thus, the premium diﬀerence rˆRt under the false policy is not very severe (recall
that the premium diﬀerence consists of the coupon premium rˆGt − rˆt and the interest spread for
the risky assets rSt ). Thus, the default gap under the false policy is very close to the exact policy.
For reference, we note that the standard deviation of the default gap to a one-percent increase in
government expenditure under the exact policy is 1.3839 and under the false policy it is 1.3684
(6th row, Table 2).
4.3 Eﬀects of Diﬀerences of Policy on Productivity and Government
Expenditure Shocks
Comparing Fig. 1 with Fig. 2, we ﬁnd that there are nonnegligible diﬀerences between policies
on productivity and government expenditure shocks. As shown in Panel 9 in Fig. 1, the tax gap
is severely reduced under the false policy, whereas it is reduced very little under the exact policy.
In addition, while the nominal interest gap is hiked under the false policy, it does not ﬂuctuate
under the exact policy, as shown in Panel 8 in Figs. 1 and 2. To cope with the productivity shock,
policy instruments are manipulated inversely. However, as shown in Panels 8 and 9 in Fig. 2,
both the tax gap and nominal interest rates are similarly manipulated. The nominal interest rate
gap decreases and the tax gap increases. Diﬀerences are almost zero in response to government
expenditure shock between exact and false policies.
The reason that response variation of monetary and ﬁscal policies depends on the type of shock
relates to how each shock shifts the NKPC. Plugging Eqs. (22), (26), and (28) and the deﬁnition
of the eﬃcient level of output into Eq. (24), we have:
πt = βEt (πt+1) +
κ (1 + σCψ)
σC
yˆt +
κτ
1− τ
τˆt +
κ (1 + σCψ)Ω2
σCΩ1
gt −
κ [(1 + ψ)σCΩ1 − (1 + σCψ) Ω3]
σCΩ1
at, (41)
where yˆt ≡ yt − y
∗
t denotes the welfare-relevant output gap. In the previous equality, the coef-
ﬁcients of the fourth and ﬁfth terms are direct eﬀects that shift the NKPC through changes in
government expenditure and through changes in productivity, respectively. Because of the dis-
torted steady state, both government expenditure and productivity appear on the NKPC, unlike
in the model assuming that monopolistic competitive power is completely dissolved. Under our
benchmark parameterization, the coeﬃcient of government expenditure is 0.0144, although that of
productivity is 0.1877. While the direct eﬀects of shifting the NKPC stemming from an increase in
government expenditure are negligible, the direct eﬀects stemming from a decrease in productivity
are nonnegligible, rather, that decrease (increase) changes inﬂation strongly.
The reason productivity shifts the NKPC strongly stems from a distorted steady state. In our
model, tax is levied on output and monopolistic competitive market power remains as long as the
tax rate is set to make the steady-state wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor Φ. To attain Φ = 0, under our setting
that tax is levied on output, the tax rate should be negative as long as the elasticity of substitution
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among goods is larger than one, namely ε > 1. Under our benchmark parameterization, the steady-
state value of the tax rate should be —0.2, which is unrealistic. Because there is a positive tax rate
in the steady state, the productivity shock is seen as a cost—push shock. The higher the steady-
state value of the tax rate, the lower the contribution of changes in productivity to increase the
target level output y∗t . The complicated parameter Ω3, which is a function of the steady-state
value of τ , appears in the deﬁnition of the target level of output Eq. (31) and the NKPC Eq.
(43). As mentioned, the higher the steady-state value of the tax rate, the lower Ω3. A decrease in
productivity decreases the target level output. However, if the steady-state value of the tax rate
is larger than its optimal value, i.e., —0.2, the target level output does not decrease enough. Then,
the output does not decrease enough. In contrast, a decrease in productivity applies pressure to
increase marginal cost, as shown in Eq. (26). Now, Ω3 is small and a decrease in the target level
output cannot absorb the decrease in productivity. This can be explained by the coeﬃcient of
productivity in Eq. (43) as follows:
κ (1 + ψ)−
κ (1 + σCψ)Ω3
σCΩ1
.
In this expression, the ﬁrst term is the direct eﬀect that increases inﬂation stemming from a decrease
in productivity and the second term is the pressure to decrease inﬂation through a decrease in the
target level output. Because the steady-state value of the tax rate exceeds its optimal value, the
direct eﬀect, to increase inﬂation, is larger than the pressure to decrease the target level output.
Thus, productivity works as a cost—push shock.
In contrast, as noted, the shift of NKPC through an increase in government expenditure is
negligible, due to a ‘non-Keynesian eﬀect’. Although government expenditure increases output,
consumption decreases simultaneously, as shown in Panel 11 in Fig. 2. The pressure to increase the
marginal cost is canceled by the decrease in consumption, and the upward shift of NKPC through
an increase in government expenditure is tiny or negligible.
Under the exact and the false policies, policy authorities have quite diﬀerent period loss func-
tions if the steady-state value of the interest spread is high. While the policy authorities under the
exact policy do not necessarily focus only on stabilizing inﬂation, the policy authorities under the
false policy almost solely focus on stabilizing inﬂation. However, an increase in government expen-
diture does not shift the NKPC very much, and inﬂation stabilization policy does not necessarily
worsen welfare costs even under the false policy. Thus, as long as government expenditure aﬀects
the economy, the policy response does not diﬀer much between the two policies. This implies that
even if there is default risk, policy authorities are not necessarily aware of this risk. However, if
productivity changes are observed, policy authorities should become aware of the risk. There is
strong pressure to increase inﬂation and to use the false policy to try to stabilize it through a
decreasing tax gap, which causes high and long-lasting default because of a worsening ﬁscal sur-
plus, although the exact policy does not cause this result. Awareness of default risk is important
if productivity changes are observed.
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5 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules and Welfare
Costs
5.1 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules
This section introduces simple policy rules. The monetary policy rule takes a class of Taylor rules:
rˆt = ϕππt, (42)
while a rule for the government conducting ﬁscal policy takes the form:
τˆt = ϕbbt−1. (43)
We ﬁnd both ϕπ and ϕb through grid search, which minimizes the consequent diﬀerence in
welfare costs under optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy. That is, we ﬁnd ϕπ and ϕb that replicate
welfare costs under optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy. The ranges of grid search are limited to
ϕπ ∈ [1, 30] and ϕb ∈ [0, 3] for the condition of determinacy. The numbers of grid are 25 for both
coeﬃcients. Lines 4 and 5 in Table3 show ϕπ and ϕb under exact and the false policy rules. As
shown in columns 2 and 5, ϕπ and ϕb under the false policy rule are larger than those under the
exact policy. This implies that inﬂation is more aggressively stabilized under the false policy, as
period loss function Eqs. (30) and (32).
For changes in productivity, although ϕπ under the exact policy is higher than it is under
the false policy, ϕb under the exact policy is smaller than it is under the false policy and is zero
(see columns 3 and 6). This implies that the exact policy is not necessarily the policy that tends
to stabilize inﬂation aggressively following changes in productivity. This is consistent with what
Panel 4 in Fig. 1 shows. For changes in government expenditure, ϕπ under the exact policy is
larger than it is following changes in productivity (see columns 3 and 4). In addition, ϕb under the
false policy is the same as it is under the exact policy (see columns 4 and 7). The two facts imply
that the exact policy is not necessarily the policy that avoids stabilizing inﬂation, and awareness
of default risk is not so important as long as changes in government expenditure hit an economy
with default risk. These implications are consistent with our discussion.
5.2 Welfare Analysis
Now we analyze the welfare properties of both policies. The expected welfare costs are given by:
∞

t=0
βtE0 (Lt) ,
which is the ﬁrst term of a second-order approximated utility function and is the sum of discounted
period welfare costs. The last line in Table 3 shows welfare costs under both the exact policy rule
and the false policy rule.12 On average, welfare costs under the exact policy are smaller than
they are under the false policy. Welfare gains from conducting the exact policy ((welfare costs
under the false policy — welfare costs under the exact policy) / welfare costs under the false
policy), namely awareness of default risk, are 64.4% following changes in both productivity and
government expenditure and when productivity changes, welfare gains from conducting the exact
12Instead of the FONCs for policy authorities, monetary policy rule Eq. (42) and ﬁscal policy rule Eq. (43) are
included in the model to calculate welfare costs.
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policy are 49.7%. These results are consistent with our intuition. However, welfare gains from
conducting the exact policy are only 1.0% and are thus negligible.
Those results generate our policy prescriptions that 3) welfare gains from conducting optimal
monetary and ﬁscal policy with awareness of default risk when there is an increase in government
expenditure are negligible, while 4) welfare gains from conducting optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policy with awareness of default risk when there is a decrease in productivity are nonnegligible
(see Section 1).
6 Conclusion
We develop a class of DSGE models with nominal rigidities and we introduce default risk to the
model. We ﬁnd that if productivity changes are observed, policy authorities should be aware
of default risk, although being aware of such risk is not very important following government
expenditure changes. Welfare gains from awareness of default risk are nonnegligible if productivity
changes, although welfare gains from awareness of default risk are tiny if government expenditure
changes.
Conclusion
The author acknowledges the ﬁnancial assistance of a grant from the Ishii Memorial Securities
Research Promotion Foundation.
Appendices
A Nonstochastic Steady State
We focus on equilibria where the state variables follow paths that are close to a deterministic
stationary equilibrium, in which Πt = 1 and
P˜t
Pt
= 1. Because this steady state is nonstochastic,
productivity has unit values; i.e., A = 1.
In this steady state, the gross nominal interest rate is equal to the inverse of the subjective
discount factor, as follows:
R = β−1.
Because Γ (0) = 1, the deﬁnition of the government debt coupon rate boils down to:
RG = R.
Notice that spt = 0 in the steady state.
Eq. (23) can be rewritten as:
P˜t
Pt
= Et

Kt
Ft

, (A.1)
with
Kt ≡
ε
ε− 1
∞

k=0
(Pt+kCt+k)
−1
Y˜t+kMC
n
t+k ; Ft ≡ Pt
∞

k=0
(Pt+kCt+k)
−1
Y˜t+k,
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which boils down in the steady state to
K =
ε
ε−1YMC
n
(1− αβ) (PC)
; F =
PY
(1− αβ) (PC)
.
Plugging those equalities into the steady-state condition of Eq. (A.1), namely K = F , yields:
P =
ε
ε− 1
MCn,
which can be rewritten as
MC =

ε
ε− 1
−1
. (A.2)
Furthermore, Eqs. (25) and (A.2) imply the following:
UN
UC
=
1− τ
ε
ε−1

µw
= 1− Φ,
with UC = C
−1 and UN = N
ψ. Note that because τ ∈ (0, 1) and ε > 1, this steady state is
distorted.
The deﬁnition of RHt boils down, in the steady state, to
RS =

1 +
B
SP
Γ′ (0)

. (A.3)
Eq. (13) boils down in the steady state to
RS = (1− δ)−1 . (A.4)
Plugging Eq. (A.4) into Eq. (A.3) and rearranging, we have:
δ =
φςτσB
τ + φςτσB
,
where we use B
SP
=

SP
Y
−1 B
Y
.
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Table 1: Parameterization
Parameter Value Source
β 0.99 Gali and Monacelli[13]
ψ 3 Gali and Monacelli[13]
θ 0.66 Gali and Monacelli[13]
ε 6 Gali and Monacelli[13]
φ 0.033 Okano and Inagaki[17]
γ 1.1736 Okano and Inagaki[17]
τ 0.3 Ferrero[11]
σG 0.276 Ferrero[11]
σB 2.4 Ferrero[11]
ςτ 1 Creedy and Gremmell[9]
Table 2: Macroeconomic Volatilities
Exact False
Shocks All Productivity Government All Productivity Government
Expenditure Expenditure
yt − y
∗
t 0.3956 0.3956 0.0046 0.0015 0.0010 0.0011
πt 0.0483 0.0483 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
rˆRt 0.6113 0.6113 0.0073 1.9594 1.9593 0.0217
δˆt 4.0151 3.7691 1.3839 8.7098 8.6016 1.3684
rˆt 0.2867 0.2691 0.0989 0.9488 0.9444 0.0914
τˆt 2.1719 1.4122 1.6501 5.8779 5.6481 1.6274
Table 3: Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules and Welfare Costs
Exact False
Shocks All Productivity Government All Productivity Government
Expenditure Expenditure
ϕπ 14.0556 9.8421 10.1579 23.5556 6.8947 17.7895
ϕb 0.3333 0 2.6842 3 3 2.6842∞
t=0 β
tE0 (Lt) 1.3476 1.3270 0.6275 3.7885 2.6545 0.6336
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Figure 1: IRFs to Unit Decrease in Productivity
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Figure 2: IRFs to Unit Increase in Government Expenditure
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